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Abstract
This paper provides evidence on the effects of information provision on households’
water use. I use quarterly household consumption data from a utility in Minnesota to test the
effect of a new residential water billing system on households’ water consumption. The updated
billing format was possible as the utility transitioned to an automated meter reading (AMR)
system. I also study impacts of another source of improved information provision from AMR
adoption, faster high-water consumption notices. I find mixed evidence of the impact of
personalized information on households’ water use. Households respond to high-consumption
notices by significantly reducing consumption, even relative to baseline-levels. Reductions from
these one-time notices wane over time as consumers return to baseline consumption levels after
three quarters. Overall, my findings suggest limited consumer-side benefits of AMR adoption.

Keywords: Informational Nudges; Water Use; High Consumption Notices; Smart Water Meter
Adoption.
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1. Introduction
The US uses 322 billion gallons of residential water per day from over 50,000 community
water systems across the US (USGS, 2018). While water supply and distribution are hailed as one
of the greatest engineering achievements of the 20th century, many water utilities rely on aging
infrastructure. The US suffers about 240,000 water main breaks annually, losing an estimated 1
trillion gallons of clean drinking water per day, enough to supply water use in more than 11
million homes (EPA, 2009). On average, US utilities incur approximately 15 percent annual NonRevenue Water (NRW) losses (Liemberger and Wyatt, 2019), meaning that 15% of clean treated
water is lost due to leakage management issues. These problems have exacerbated in recent years,
with water main break rates increasing 27% from 2012 to 2018 (Baird and Folkman, 2018). The
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) concluded that current funding from all levels of
government and current revenues generated from ratepayers will not be sufficient to meet the
nation’s future demand for water infrastructure. They estimate that an additional $10-20 billion
dollars are required (CBO, 2003).

Innovation has provided new solutions to the challenges faced by water utilities, particularly
with the development of data-driven technologies that allow for data collection automation and
improvements in pipeline asset management. The ‘Smart Water’ movement, a new technological
movement, offers improved management to confront challenges such as water scarcity, aging
infrastructure, and uncertainty due to climate change. It is expected that water utilities in the US
will spend $20 billion on software, data, and analytics solutions over the next decade with more
than $15 billion of that spent on smart meters (Bluefield Research, 2017). These new smart meter
water solutions include Automatic Meter Readers (AMR), which allow for precise, safe, and
efficient data collection capabilities that create operational efficiencies. Other more sophisticated
solutions such as Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) provide better decision making
through data analytics and real time insights. While smart water solutions such as AMR/AMI
meters provide benefits such as advanced leak detection and water usage measurement and
management, convincing water utilities to adopt these technologies remains a challenge
(Freyberg, 2017). Unlike the electricity sector, where four in five electric utilities in the US have
adopted new metering technologies, only one in five water utilities have adopted a smart meter
infrastructure (Saiyid, 2017). While there is ample empirical research on the effects of smart
metering technologies on household electricity use (Gans et.al., 2013; Gilbert and Zivin 2014;
Jessoe and Rapson, 2014; Sexton 2015), there is more limited research about its effects in the
water sector (Wichman, 2017; Jessoe, et.al, 2019).
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This paper studies consumer-side impacts of smart meter adoption on water use in the city of
Edina as the city transitioned from a manual meter reading system (MMR) to an automatic
metering infrastructure (AMR). Specifically, I analyze the effects of personalized behavioral
messaging and quicker-in home leak detection on water use to understand benefits of smart
metering infrastructure. For my analysis, I combine household-level water consumption and
water leakage data for 13,339 residents with detailed household-level characteristics and weather
data.

I first study the impacts of information provision enabled by the switch to an AMR billing
system. Between 2012 and 2013, most residents saw a change in the format of their water bills,
including more comprehensive information about their historical consumption patterns. Different
empirical designs provide contrasting evidence on the effect of this new information, where either
the switch to AMR billing increased consumption by 2% to 6% or did not affect consumption.
Consistent with prior work, I find evidence heterogeneity in households’ response to the new
information, with low-baseline water consumers potentially increasing consumption 2% to 4%
more than high-baseline water consumers. Second, I explore the benefits of quicker leak detection
from AMR systems by studying the effects of high consumption notices on consumer behavior.
After a leak or high-consumption notice, consumers decrease consumption by 19% to 26%. The
decrease is sustained for more than two quarters, after which consumers return to baseline water
use levels.

My work provides important evidence of potential consumer-side benefits of smart meter
adoption. A key challenge for smart water metering adoption is the high fixed costs of
installation. There is a large disparity between smart meter adoption between energy and water
utilities. Much of this disparity can be explained by variations in population served, which
constrains the amount of capital a utility can raise. Water utilities are best classified as natural
monopolies (Ferro et al., 2011).1 Smaller utilities, of which there are many in the US, have both
higher average costs and lower capital thresholds, which may deter investment in AMR and AMI
infrastructure.

1

Ferro et al., 2011 show variations in efficiency of water provision for populations in the range of 100,000
to 1 million people served, where there are decreases in average costs. They found remarkable economies
of scale for the smaller utilities, and moderate economies of scale for average sized utilities.
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Benefits of AMR/AMI infrastructure include labor cost savings, quicker leak detection, and
increased ability to message consumers. Utility cost savings from smart meter adoption are
relatively easy to determine. Traditional manual meter reading takes 50 days on average, limiting
utility’s ability to bill customers once every two to three months (Atkinson, 2016). Additionally,
misreads using manual meter reading systems (MMR) are common, as the process was a manual
visual process. AMR meters, the least expensive smart metering infrastructure, reduces these
labor costs and improves accuracy of reads. AMR meters uses a drive-by system, or “truck rolls,”
that allows utilities to multi-task, collecting meter reading as they are out for maintenance work
or other services. More sophisticated, yet more expensive, metering systems such as AMI meters
can provide additional detailed real time hourly-consumption data not just monthly-consumption
data. Additionally, AMI meters allow for the identification of system leaks, not just individual
customer location leaks. 2 Less is known about consumer-side AMI/AMR impacts.
Understanding consumer benefits, should they exist, may therefore be important in determining
whether AMR/AMI infrastructure is a worthwhile investment for water utilities.

This paper first discusses the current literature of the effects of social norms on consumption
and the importance of billing frequency in Section 2. I then provide background and discuss the
setting of this study, presenting the data and describing their limitations in Section 3. In Section 4,
the paper will present the identification strategy for the average treatment effect of both changes
in water bills and the average treatment effects of high consumption/leak notices. Section 5
presents results and Section 6 concludes.

2. Literature Review
AMR meters allows utilities to better automate collection of data, which can later be used in a
variety of ways to engage residential water consumers, particularly in utility water conservation
efforts. Water agencies have implemented a range of conservation measures for managing
residential water demand including mandatory water restrictions (Kenney et al.,2004; Grafton et
al., 2008), market-based policies such as water pricing (Arbues et al., 2003; Dalhuisen et al.
2003), subsidies for water saving devices (Campbell et al., 2004), and the promotion of water
conservation attitudes through information policies (Wichman, 2015; Olmstead and Stavins,

2

For example, AMI system installation cost $14 million for 64,000 metering systems for the city of
Madison, Wisconsin in 2012. Smaller utilities such as the city of Rowlett, Texas oversaw a $2.7 million
project as they upgraded 18,000 meters from AMR to AMI in 2017.
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2009; Ferraro and Price, 2013 ; Jessoe et.al., 2017). Although economic theory suggests that
water price-based approaches are economically efficient (Griffin, 2001), prices in the water sector
are politically difficult to change (Wichman, 2015). For most utilities it is infeasible to increase
prices to marginal cost, spurring increased attention of non-pecuniary measures such as
informational nudges.

Smart water meters also allow utilities to increase customer of their water use and water
prices. Water demand management is necessary because consumers engage in water market with
limited information. Most households do not understand that they are part of a transaction every
time they open their faucet. Consumers tend to only realize the implications of their water use
when they receive their bills, which in many cases occurs infrequently.3 A key requirement for
markets to behave efficiently is that agents behave with perfect information. In water and
electricity markets, consumers imperfectly perceive prices and quantities (Ito, 2014). As such,
providing consumers with more information can affect their behavior through improved price and
quantity perception. More generally, increased information provision often reduces consumption
as consumers generally underestimate quantity and prices (Gans et al., 2013; Gilbert and Zivin,
2014; Sexton, 2014). Here, I describe key research studying the impacts of information provision
and nudges on water use and other similar settings.

2.1 Information Provision, Nudges, and Water Use
Information provision is a cost-effective way to abridge consumer’s knowledge gap,
without relying on coercion or significant changes in economic incentives. However, there are
many kinds of information and, depending on the type of information, the literature has seen
contrasting effects on consumer behavior. Variability in results occur as the effects of an increase
in information depend on how the consumer perceives prices and quantity prior to receiving more
information. If consumers under perceived prices or quantity, then an increase in information may
decrease quantity consumed and vice versa. It is also possible to encounter opposing forces from
prices and quantity such as an under perception4 of quantity and an over perception5 of price. In

3

For example, Edina provides water bills every quarter.
An under perception of quantity is when a user believes that they are consuming less water than their
actual consumption quantity.
5
An over perception of price is when a user believes that the cost for the use of water is greater than its
actual cost. For example, they believe that the cost of taking an additional one minute for each shower costs
is greater than the actual cost.
4

4

these cases, the effect of increases in information frequency will depend on which effect is
greater, price or quantity (Chetty et al., 2009; Wichman, 2015). The following sections explores
how each type of information provision helps correct customer’s misperceptions and its potential
effects on consumption reduction.

Own-consumption feedback is one way to provide information. Results differ in the
literature as to the effects of this type of information provision. Geller et al (1983) explore the
effect of weekly mail-based consumption information about past consumer patterns. The authors
find no impact of their intervention on consumption patterns. In contrast, Kenney, et al (2008)
provided consumers with in-home displays (IHD) that included real-time information about water
consumption and found a 16% increase in consumption.6 Finally, Sonderlund et al. (2016) shows
that installing shower alarms to alert high consumption levels lead to a 26% decrease in shower
related consumption.

Another type of information provision, social norms messaging provides consumers
information about how their consumption compares to that of their neighbors. Social norms seek
to change consumption patterns by correcting the customer’s misperceptions or by presenting a
standard against which consumers can compare their behavior. Yet, the utilization of social norms
can have differential effects to different types of consumers as can act as a magnet for behavior
for individuals both above and below average consumption levels (Allcott, 2011). Because of this
magnet effect, households already consuming at a low rate may have a boomerang effect after
receiving social comparisons messages, which may increase their consumption. Fortunately, the
inclusion of positive reinforcement to initially low-rate consumers has shown to mitigate the
boomerang effect (Schultz, 2007; Ferraro and Price, 2013; Bernedo, 2013). Recent empirical
studies on social norms messaging have shown the extent of the effectiveness of these “nudges”
as a cost-effective water and energy conservation policy (Allcott and Mullainathan, 2010; Ferraro
and Price, 2013; Brent et al., 2015; Jessoe, et.al, 2017).

Empirical evidence in a large-scale water conservation program for 100,000 households
in Atlanta, Georgia indicates that norm-based messages have led to a 2 percent decline in average
water use, where additional social comparison messages led to a further 4.8 percent decline in

6

The study however does suggest that the increase can be attributed to the variable rates pricing structure,
where consumers moved to a cheaper low-rate hour as a financial incentive.
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average water use. 7 The study shows that the social comparison messages had a greater influence
on behavior among high consuming households, who tend to be the least price sensitive (Ferraro
and Price, 2013). This means that the appeal to social norms is most effective amongst high-use
households, suggesting that there might be heterogeneity in treatment effects depending on the
user type. For most studies in the literature, social norms messaging has shown a decrease in
average household water use and a comparatively greater influence on high consuming
households (Ferraro and Price, 2013; Bernedo, et.al, 2013; Bolsen and Ferraro, 2014; Brent, et.al,
2015). However, other studies show limited effect of social norms messaging on water
consumption, especially for low baseline consumers (Ferraro and Miranda, 2013; Jessoe, et.al,
2017; Kažukauskas, et.al, 2017). In contrast to my setting, most utilities in these studies provided
social norms messaging every month, and often in separate mailers. As I describe below,
frequency of information is important.

Although information can reduce consumption immediately, evidence suggests that the
effects can wane over time (Gilbert and Zivin, 2014). This is consistent with the “Focus Theory
of Normative Conduct” in psychology, which argues that social norms affect behavior only when
at top of mind (Kallgren, et al., 2000). For example, empirical evidence on the effect of
information on electricity bills shows that consumers decrease consumption after the receipt of a
utility bill, but they revert to their baseline level at the end of the month (Gilbert and Zivin, 2014).
Yet it is possible that the normative appeals encourage the adoption of water-efficient
technologies, which would lead to long-term decreases in consumption. However, given the large
up-front costs associated with new technologies such as low flow shower heads or high efficiency
toilets, it is likely that it will affect fewer households (Ferraro and Price, 2013).

AMI meters and to a limited extent AMR meters provide utilities the opportunity to
communicate their data to their customers and much more quickly through notifications that
directly reach households with consumptive use information and notifications of customer-side
leaks. Some notification systems help households identify the type of leak based on volume and
other factors. One example of real time consumer communication is Roseville, California, which
experienced a 4.6% reduction in water use. Its reduction was largely attributed to its
communication interphase, which provided households quick communication through prompts
and reminders, high-use alerts, and leak alerts. Educational programs and real-time consumer
7

Norm-based messages inform users about the need to reduce water consumption. Appealing to the
protection of resources.
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communication have gotten households more interested in their water use habits, a step towards
promoting conservation behavior (West Governor’s Drought Forum, 2015). Closer to my setting,
a 2010 Duluth study on the electricity sector showed that continuous engagement with a feedback
interface was critical because households genuinely interested in reducing their consumption need
reminders and prompts to correct their consumption and engage with the communication interface
(Bensch et al. 2014).

Frequency of engagement and the frequency at which households receive reminders
about their consumption is another way policymakers can increase conservation effort.
Information policy literature highlights the importance of the frequency of information for
consumer’s attention. Increases in frequency of information has also shown evidence of increased
conservation efforts and habit formation (Jessoe and Rapson, 2014). Given that these transactions
are not instantaneous in the eyes of the consumers, increasing the frequency of utility bills or
reminders through a communication interface offers consumers an opportunity to update their
consumption in response to external feedback. However, some empirical studies show that
customers increase consumption as billing information increases in response to more frequent
information. (Wichman, 2015). Explanations to this consumption increase range from low prices
set below the long run marginal cost (Mansur and Olmstead, 2012), or information presented was
not-user friendly making initially interested households on data feedback lose their willingness to
engage with the data due to its complexity (Bensch et al., 2014).

3. Setting
The City of Edina went through a substantial $3.6 million dollar restructuring of their
water metering infrastructure from 2012-2013 The utility replaced their manual metering system
(MMR) to an automatic meter reading system (AMR). The smart water project that was
announced in 2010 and provided free installation of AMR meters to all their customers. The
AMR metering system is considerably more expensive ($270 per device) compared to MMR
devices ($25 per device). According to the utility, the main motivation for such an investment
was to reduce labor costs associated with the billing process and improvements in asset/pipeline
management. AMR meters provide enhanced tracking of usage and more efficient billing by
collecting usage and consumption data through radio networks. AMR metering systems allow for
easier data collection which can be used to better evaluate location of leaks and predict potential
pipeline failures. This new system has saved the City of Edina the expense of periodic trips to
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each physical location to read a meter, reducing billing labor costs related to billing. Also, by
replacing older infrastructure, AMR meters can provide more accurate billing with a more
standardized meter inventory.

Once installation of the new metering system was completed, households in Edina
transitioned to a new water bill. The major difference between the new and old bill was the
inclusion of a graph of historical, own consumption patterns for every household. Importantly, the
graphic does not compare households’ usage to other households or provide an injunctive norm.
It may, therefore, be hard for consumers to update their beliefs as to whether their own
consumption is high or low relative to an average or standard. However, the new format does
provide households with more information about their historical consumption patterns for which
consumers can evaluate against and see if they are reducing or increasing consumption compared
to previous periods. The water bill frequency was unchanged from its original quarterly billing
system.

The installation of the new AMR system was completed in phases by neighborhoods. As
seen in Figure 1, the first neighborhoods to see the new metering systems were in the south-west
of Edina in between Braemar and Creek Valley Park during the second quarter of 2012. Next,
households in the north part of Edina had meters installed in the first quarter of 2013. Finally,
neighborhoods in the south east part of the city had their metering systems change at the end of
the third quarter of 2013. By the end of 2013, nearly all households had the new AMR meter
installed in their homes.
Figure 1: AMR Installation Over Time

8

The city of Edina provides an interesting case study as the city is relatively affluent
compared to the rest of the US. The average median household income in Edina was $99,295 and
the median property value was $459,200. This is considerably higher than the US average median
household income of $64,300 and the median property value of $217,500 (US Census Bureau,
2015). Given that water bills are a small proportion of income, it is possible that conventional
market-based policies do not have a great effect on reducing consumption in an affluent
neighborhood like Edina. Therefore, it is important to analyze how own-past consumption
information could be used as a conservation measure.

Figure 2: Average Quarterly Water Consumption (2008-2015)8

3.1 Data

I use water billing data and leak notices data provided by the City of Edina, Minnesota.
Included in the data are quarterly water and wastewater use, the location of the household, the
date of their latest water meter change, and their current water meter. I matched consumption data
with geocoded county parcel data from 2020 obtained from Hennepin County. The county parcel
data includes assessed property market values and parcel lot area estimates. To account for
weather influences on water consumption I collected quarterly precipitation, snow, and
8

Black dotted lines represent the drought period, and the orange lines represent the installation rollout
period for most households. High and Low consumers were divided based on their consumption prior to
installation, and they were divided by the mean of the sample.
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temperature data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).9 The total
and mean values for each weather variable is matched to each households’ billing cycle.

Important to my study, the city of Edina experienced a drought in 2013, which coincides
with the installation of these devices for many households in the region. Figure 2 shows a spike in
consumption during 2013, at the same time when there was one of the worst widespread droughts
in in its history. The State of Minnesota during 2013, experienced what’s called a “concrete frost”
– an impenetrable layer of frozen soil. In response to the concrete frost and degrading soil
conditions, many households increased their outdoor water consumption to maintain their lawns.
Figure 2 shows how consumption spikes during the drought period. Although there have been
other droughts in our timeframe that we can use to control for this effect, the effects of droughts
vary depending on their length and intensity. While it is possible to control for drought intensity,
the unique nature and length of the 2013 drought makes controlling for its effect empirically
challenging. Nonetheless, I control for such droughts use drought indicators from the US drought
monitor classification10. Droughts are defined in different levels. In our study we will only
evaluate two different levels. Drought Level 1 which is when water shortages are common, and
some utilities impose water restrictions. Drought Level 2 indicates widespread water shortages
and there are extreme drought experiences across the county. One potential limitation of using
this strategy is that droughts severity is not only expressed by intensity but also by length.
Unfortunately, these drought level indicators do not capture potential differences in intensity, and
in addition longer droughts tend to also have long-term consequences. This can mean that
consumption might increase even after the end of a drought.
I restrict my analysis to a balanced panel of single-family residential homes,11 ensuring I
observe each household for the full timeframe of the study, 2008 to 2015.12 This study drops
multi-family homes, non-residential properties, seasonal recreational residential houses,
apartments/condos, and properties with multiple accounts. I remove the latter to reduce the
impact of renters who might have water bills as part of their rent. The final sample of our study

I calculate the total and average values for each weather estimate to match each household each to
their billing cycles which have different quantity consumption months, even if they have similar
billing quarters.
9
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National Drought Mitigation Center (NDMC), 2021. United States Drought Monitor
I restrict the dataset from the original 13,339 households in the billing dataset provided by Edina
12
Edina updated their prices every year from 2008-2015, and they charge water using an increasing block
pricing structure with a fixed yearly charge for their services.
11
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consists of 6,332 single-family residential households with water use from the first quarter of
2008 to the fourth quarter of 2015.

Summary statistics are shown in Table 1. The columns break up household and water use
characteristics by the quarters in which households transitioned from MMR to AMR billing. The
last column provides summary statistics for the entire sample. Every characteristic looks similar
across installation waves. The only large differences are seen across installation waves with very
few households. For example, the installation of AMR meters for 2013 quarters 3 and 4 look to
have big differences in housing prices but this is mainly because only a few houses are present in
the sample, therefore they are more sensitive to high priced outliers. Outside of those estimates, it
looks like each installation wave does not have significant differences in household statistics as
they do not drift away too far from the full sample estimates. For households who installed their
water meters during 2013Q3 or after, it seems that they have a higher house market value (a
proxy for their wealth) and larger parcel areas. The higher the parcel area, we would expect
households to consume more water due to greater outdoor irrigation consumption, which is why
households in these periods seem to have a slightly greater average water consumption level. For
the average household in the sample, the mean house market value is around $625,000, telling us
about the affluent nature of our sample and of the city of Edina. The average parcel area is 14,500
square feet, around a third of an acre, and on average houses are 50 years old as of 2012.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for households that received first AMR bill for each installation
wave (2008-2011 averages)13
Installation Wave
Average

2012.Q3 or less 2012.Q4 2013.Q1 2013.Q2 2013.Q3 or more Full Sample

Quarterly Water

26.52

24.98

25.02

26.45

23.60

25.49

(16.7)

(15.9)

(15.9)

(17.4)

(16.9)

(16.3)

46.27

55.16

56.69

52.45

46.09

52.44

(12.9)

(20.1)

(19.0)

(16.0)

(26.2)

(18.6)

494

536

526

516

625

524

(172.9)

(253.6)

(235.7)

(233.9)

(421.3)

(239.8)

14.1

13.1

10.3

12.0

14.3

12.7

(8.6)

(8.7)

(4)

(6.4)

(39.2)

(11.1)

1,747

2,164

1,570

573

278

6,332

Use

Age of home
(as of 2008)

House Value
($1000)

Parcel Area
(1000 sq feet)

Count

Overall, Table 1 shows that installation were not targeted to particularly high consuming
households first, and overall household characteristics look to be very similar across installation
waves. This is evidence that the assignment of automatic meter reading and the subsequent
change to a new billing system is plausibly exogenous to the households. Although there are
variations in household characteristics these variations are likely due to different neighborhood
characteristics, rather than explicit selection for the purposes of reducing demand by the utility.
Installation of AMR devices occurs in quick succession and by the end of 2013 more than 95% of
the households end up treated. Concerns about exogeneity come as the utility decides which
neighborhoods receive their AMR. There may be concerns if the utility strategically decided
which neighborhoods received AMR’s first. There are also concerns of unintended selection bias
but the time at which you are selected for installation should not necessarily affect your water
consumption patterns.

13

Standard Errors in parentheses
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Figure 1 highlights that water consumption exhibits a cyclical pattern, where
consumption tends to spike during the summer where there are more opportunities for irrigation
or other water-intensive activities. We also see an overall consumption decline since 2008,
signaling potential technological changes during the time period and a justification to use year
fixed effects to prevent omitted variable bias.

I also use a high consumption notices dataset, provided by the City of Edina, where
consumption values that were two standard deviations above the expected consumption values
were flagged for review for potential leaks. Although it is not a perfect label for a leak, I used it
as a proxy for a leak. These leakages are only limited to residential pipelines, and do not include
system-wide leakage values within the system. It is also important to note that given that only a
small substrata of the household’s experience leak notices, the number of households analyzed for
the leak event study was reduced to just 78 households.14

4. Empirical Strategy
I use two complementary approaches to identify the average households’ demand
responses to AMR installation. I start with a differences-in-differences design that uses withinneighborhood variation. The design leverages the roll-out of the installations to compare shortrun water use impacts of the new billing structure on households’ water use. I then turn to an
event study design, that uses within-household variation in water use centered at the timing of the
new billing infrastructure.

4.1 Difference-in-Differences
I start with a two-way fixed effects difference-in-differences model. The model relies on
some key assumptions, which include stable unit treatment value (Imbens and Rubin, 2015),
specific parallel trend assumptions (Marcus and Sant’Anna, 2020), and homogeneous treatment
effects across groups and periods (De Chaisemartin and D'Haultfoeuille, 2020). I estimate the
following equation:
ln(𝑤𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 [𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙]𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑞 + 𝜋𝑦 + 𝜌𝑡 + 𝛼𝑛 + 𝑋 ′ Γ + 𝜖𝑖𝑡

(1)

14

Among the households, we see a variation in consecutive leak notices, number of leaks during the 20082015 period, and the timing of these leaks. This also suggests that we analyze more than 78 leaks as there
are some households that had more than one leak during the period.
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Where (𝑤𝑖𝑡 )is household i’s log water consumption in year-quarter t. Install is a dummy
variable that equals 1 after household i’s meter was installed. To account for seasonality, and
trends in water consumption, I include fixed effects for year (𝜋𝑦 ) and quarter cycle (𝛿𝑞 ).15 I
include the interaction of quarter and cycle time fixed effects due to differences in billing cycles.
I also include neighborhood fixed effects 𝛼𝑛 , which is defined by the census tract, to account for
unobservable neighborhood-specific characteristics. I also include additional household
characteristics control variables (𝑋′) which include lot size, house age, and house market value,
which is used as a proxy for wealth. To account for different weather conditions (𝜌𝑡 ), I also
control for the aggregate quarterly precipitation, quarterly average temperature, and quarterly
snow precipitation. Finally, it is the residual error term that will capture unobservable water
consumption characteristics such as heterogeneity between high and low users, heterogeneity
between different billing cycles, and other omitted variables.

The difference-in-difference approach uses neighborhood fixed effects over household
level fixed effects to understand the variation within neighborhood. If we use household level
fixed effects, there is risk that we might cut the limited variation in consumption across our study.
Most importantly we would have trouble identifying long-run effects of the change in information
policy if we used household fixed effects due to its limited variation. By evaluating both
neighborhood level and household level fixed effects using the event study we are also able to
identify potential issues in our two-way fixed effects controls if the estimates are not
aligned/resemble similarity. As an alternative to household level fixed effects, I include baseline
household consumption in some difference-in-differences as a way to control for differential
average quarter consumption patterns across consumers. When regressing with a baseline
consumption, our study is modified to only include years from 2010 -2015 as the baseline will
include quarterly averages for each household from 2008-2010.

4.2 Event Study

I use a complementary event study approach that estimates within household variation in
water use before and after treatment. I compare the event study estimates to the results in the
difference-in-differences approach. I estimate an event study analysis of the following form:
15

Quarter cycle is an indicator between the quarter and cycle combination. We have 12 different quarter
cycles, as seen in the Appendix.
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𝜏

ln(𝑤𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑

𝑗=−𝜏

𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙j 1[𝑡 = 𝑗] + 𝛿𝑞 + 𝛼𝑛 + 𝜌𝑡 + 𝑋′Γ + 𝜖𝑖𝑡

(2)

I restrict the event study timeframe to 2 years (8 quarters) before and after treatment, and
I include the same controls as our specifications in equation (1). I allow for differential treatment
effects by event-quarter, 𝛽𝑗 . The event study includes neighborhood, cycle-quarter, and year fixed
effects.
4.3 Leak Event Study
Last, I use an event study to understand the effects of leak notices on water consumption.
I estimate the impact of leak notices 4 quarters (1 year) before and after households receive leak
notices,16 for a total event time window of 8 periods (2 years). I estimate the following model:
𝜏

ln(𝑤𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑

𝑗=−𝜏

𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒j 1[𝑡 = 𝑗] + 𝛿𝑞 + 𝛼𝑛 + 𝜌𝑡 + 𝑋′Γ + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (3)

Equation (3) includes the same controls as our preferred specifications in equation (2).
Compared to the equation (2) I normalize the coefficients to be relative to 𝛽−4 , the coefficient on
1[t = -4]. This allows me to compare water consumption to a “normal/baseline” set of
consumption values instead of the value at 𝛽0 which is an unusual consumption value.

5. Results
5.1 New water bill information and water consumption
Table 2 presents average treatment effects of the updated billing format using my
difference-in-differences model. The results show that, when regressions do not account for
seasonality, estimates show that receiving new AMR bills reduces consumption by 7%. But as
seen in Figure 2, households increase consumption during the summer as households’ water their
lawn and make use of higher intensity water activities (swimming, water sports). Therefore, such
cyclical pattern needs to be controlled to better understand the effects of the new water bills.
When I control for the year either through fixed effects or using it as a controlling variable, we
see that consumers see their consumption increase after receiving new bills. These variables
control for unobservables that may bias the average treatment effect estimate such as
technological improvements in irrigation and water efficient machinery that have occurred across

16

In the dataset there are households that have consecutive leak notices. Therefore, for the purpose of this
study, event zero can include more than one period as it is the label for all periods (singular or consecutive)
with a leak event notice.
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the years. When I include these controls, we see that households have an insignificant increase in
their water consumption after receiving new water billing information.

Table 2: Difference-in-Difference Results (ATE: Average Treatment Effect of new water bill
information)17
Regression
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.0779***

-0.135***

0.0212**

0.0448***

(0.00313)

(0.0032)

(0.00694)

(0.00753)

Household
Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Weather Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Leaks Removed

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year + Year^2
Baseline
Consumption

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Neighborhood FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year FE

No

No

No

Yes

Cycle Quarter FE

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.118

0.153

0.433

0.433

New Water Bill
(ATE)

Controls

Fixed Effects

Adj R-squared

As expected, there is a significant increase in our adjusted R-square estimates when we
use baseline consumption as part of our model, as we insert individual consumption patterns as
part of the regression. Once included, we see that ATE are not significantly altered compared to
the ATE of other regressions estimates without baseline consumption as part of the regression
setting.

The difference-in-difference approach estimates a potential increase in consumption of
2.1- 4.4% in water consumption after the introduction of AMR bills. These average treatment
effects may obscure important heterogeneity among households. I, therefore, also explore

17

*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Standard Errors in parentheses.
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whether the new billing format had heterogeneous impacts across households based on whether
they were high- versus low-baseline users.

Table 3 presents my results. High-baseline households tend to be more responsive to the
new bill format than low-baseline households by 2% to 4%. Similar to other empirical studies
(Schultz, 2007; Ferraro and Price, 2013), I find that information effects have heterogeneous
treatment effects depending on the type of household. Similarly, to Ferraro and Price, high
consumption households tend to have a comparatively greater consumption decrease. Table 3
shows that consumption from high users drops to 1.7% to 4%, while consumption from low users
increases by 4-6%. These differential treatment effects further provide evidence of potential
benefits of selective messaging. If the utility would like to decrease household consumption
levels, they might want to primarily target high-baseline consumption users.
Table 3: Heterogeneity (ATE: Average Treatment Effect of new water bill information)18
Regression
(1)

(2)

ATE for High Consumption Users -0.0404*** -0.0169*
(0.00792) (0.00844)
ATE for Low Consumption Users 0.0460*** 0.0697***
(0.00711) (0.00768)
Controls
Household Controls

Yes

Yes

Weather Controls

Yes

Yes

Leaks Removed

Yes

Yes

Year + Year^2

Yes

No

Baseline Consumption

Yes

Yes

Neighborhood FE

Yes

Yes

Year FE

No

Yes

Cycle Quarter FE

Yes

Yes

0.434

0.434

Fixed Effects

Adj R-squared

18

*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Standard Errors in parentheses.
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Figure 3 presents results from the event study model. As a reminder, the event study
model relies on within household variation, comparing average water consumption in the quarters
before and after the new billing format in event time. Unlike the difference-in-differences results,
Figure 3 shows little evidence of a change in average water consumption after households
switched to the new billing format. The Figure shows a general downward trend in water
consumption, and there is little change in consumption in the quarter after households started
receiving the new billing format.
Figure 3: Event Study Water Consumption over Time

Figure 4 presents results from a similar exercise exploring heterogeneous impacts of the
new billing format across high- and low-baseline water consumers. Low baseline consumers
show limited effects of new information provision. Like Figure 3, high-baseline consumers
exhibit a strong, unabated downward trend in consumption before and after the new billing
format, again suggesting limited to no impact of the new information. Overall, the results suggest
the bill had no impact on average consumption for any households, conflicting with the difference
in differences model. However, standard errors are large, and I cannot rule out small impacts.

Figure 4: Event Study Water Consumption Low vs High Baseline consumers
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Results from the event study model are consistent with Geller, et.al (1983) and Brent,
et.al (2015), who show that own-consumption messages provide limited effects on water
consumption, with significant heterogeneity across the distribution of baseline water use.19
Consistent with earlier studies, we find that treatment is most effective on high baseline water
users (Alcott, 2011; Ferraro and Miranda, 2013; Ferraro and Price, 2013). These studies argue
that conservation policies should be targeted to subgroups that are more responsive to reduce the
costs of such implementations. Yet the decreasing consumption trend shown by high-baseline
consumers in Figure 4 indicates that there may be other pre-treatment trends (before billing
statement switch) that are producing this decrease in consumption. Potential drivers of this
decrease might be the development of more water efficient irrigation technologies, changes in
landscaping, or the development of other water efficient products which seem to have a greater
effect on higher baseline users. 20

Results from our event study are consistent with (Geller, et.al, 1983; Brent, et.al 2015)
which show that own-consumption messages provide limited effects on water consumption, with
significant heterogeneity across the distribution of baseline water use.21 Consistent with earlier
19

The study looks at three different cities in California randomizing households into treatment.
Other water efficient products include showerheads, toilets, dishwashers, washing machines.
21
The study looks at three different cities in California randomizing households into treatment.
20

19

studies, we find that treatment is most effective on high baseline water users (Alcott, 2011;
Ferraro and Miranda, 2013; Ferraro and Price, 2013). These studies argue that conservation
policies should be targeted to subgroups that are more responsive to reduce the costs of such
implementations. Yet the decreasing consumption trend shown by high-baseline consumers in
Figure 4 indicates that there may be other pre-treatment trends (before billing statement switch)
that are producing this decrease in consumption. Potential drivers of this decrease might be the
development of more water efficient irrigation technologies, changes in landscaping, or the
development of other water efficient products which seem to have a greater effect on higher
baseline users. 22

Higher consumption users and Low consumption users to a lesser extent may violate the
parallel pre-trends assumptions, and the decreases in consumption cannot be solely attributed on
the introduction of social norms billing information, particularly to the high-consumption
subgroup. Negative pre-trends show that there is not enough evidence to suggest that highbaseline consumers are more responsive to these policies.

5.2 Leaks and consumer response

Figure 5 presents my results for the impact of high-consumption, or leak, notices on
average household water usage. As a reminder, the coefficient four quarters before the leak
notice is normalized to zero. Consistent with the utility definition of a residential leak,
households with high-consumption alerts increase water consumption 15% to 50%, with an
average of 33.3% increase compared to their baseline levels, in the quarter the leak notice is
delivered. Importantly, households respond quickly to the notices. Consumption for most
households decreases by 19% to 26% relative to to baseline levels, a significant decrease in
consumption. These reductions are sustained for at least two quarters, with baseline levels after
three quarters.

The results suggest that the shock of high bill statements causes consumers to overcorrect, reducing consumption below their baseline usage levels temporarily. In other words, it is
possible that leaks serve as a shock intervention to consumers changing their perceptions about
water conservation. It is important to note that the shock is not sustained as consumers return to

22

Other water efficient products include showerheads, toilets, dishwashers, washing machines.

20

their baseline levels of consumption, as consumers forget about their conservation goals, which is
in par with Gilbert and Zivin (2014), where one-time interventions have shown to wane over
time.

The current data frequency does not allow me to definitively assess the benefits of faster
leak detection. However, my results suggest households respond quickly to such notices. If this
result holds for shorter time steps (e.g., weekly or daily consumption after receiving a leak
notice), then AMR systems may have the additional conservation benefit of allowing utilities to
respond to abnormally high-water usage among residential consumers more quickly.

Figure 5: Leak Event Study Water Consumption over Time

6. Conclusion
This paper evaluates whether increased billing information affects residential water use.
The literature provides varying results for the effects of different types of information on
household water consumption. Our study shows limited evidence of an effect of ownconsumption information on household water use. Complementary methodologies provide
contrasting results. Our difference and difference methodology that looks at within-neighborhood
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variation suggests that billing led to an increase in consumption, while our event study that looks
at within household variation shows limited effect of this new information provision.

Our estimates concur with other studies such as Ferraro and Miranda, (2013); Jessoe, et.al
(2017); Kažukauskas, et.al (2017) that show limited effect of information policies on
consumption. This does not suggest that information policies, which are easier to implement after
the installation of AMR/AMI meters, are not an effective water demand management tool. Other
informational policies such as social norms messaging have shown to effectively decrease
consumption, particularly during droughts (Ferraro and Price, 2013; Bernedo, et.al, 2013; Bolsen
and Ferraro, 2014)

Additionally, my estimates on the effects on consumption via new billing information
might be limited due to the low frequency of the information. We are unable to capture much of
the effects of receiving such notices as consumers tend to react right after receiving billing
information, but their conservation efforts are not persistent as they return to baseline levels
(Schultz, 2007). There is a possibility households do react right after receiving a water bill, but
unfortunately due to limitations on the frequency of the data, our study could not explore such
effects.

When evaluating consumer behavior during leaks, our results show that consumers
decrease consumption below baseline level after fixing their leaks. Consumption for most
households decreases by 17-25% compared to baseline levels. And such decreases are sustained
for at least 2 quarters but for most households, consumption returns back to normal after 3
quarters. This provides evidence that consumers do react to some information nudges by
changing their behavior, but they are unable to persist as consumer’s attention is malleable and
non-durable. And although we are unable to compare the benefits of leak detection due to the
frequency of data, our results on consumption patterns after a high consumption or leak notices
suggests that the response is immediate. Assuming that these consumption patterns remain true
even to a higher frequency there can be additional benefits of quicker leak notices, which is
possible with the new AMR infrastructure.

Our results show that the benefits of AMR installation come mostly from the utility
operations side, as the utility benefits from labor savings and potentially better leak detection.
And this is no surprise as the utility carried out AMR infrastructure restructuring plan for

22

operational purposes. And although our study might show that information has limited effect on
consumption, these findings do not carry over to AMI or other information provision methods
such as social norms. Literature shows that social norms policy can be used as an effective water
demand management tool. Edina does provide an interesting case to evaluate social norms
messaging in the future particularly due to its affluent nature, non-pecuniary measures might be
more effective as a water demand management tool as prices and water bills are just a very small
proportion of their income. Also, the utility did not change their frequency of billing after the
introduction of AMR meters, and it is possible that the effects of the new bill might not be as
pronounced as conservation efforts wane out. This means that billing systems such AMI which
allow for real-time communication with consumers might see beneficial conservation efforts as
consumers will receive more consistent reminders on their consumption levels, potentially
promoting conservation habits.
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8. Appendix
Table 4: Composition of Billing Cycles
1. CYCLE 01:
o Q1 = January, February, March aggregated estimates
o Q2 = April, May, June aggregated estimates
o Q3 = July, August, September aggregated estimates
o Q4 = October + November + December aggregated estimates
2. CYCLE 02:
o Q1 = November, December, January aggregated estimates
o Q2 = February, March, April aggregated estimates
o Q3 = May, June, July aggregated estimates
o Q4 = August, September, October aggregated estimates
3. CYCLE 03:
o Q1 = December, January, February aggregated estimates
o Q2 = March, April, May aggregated estimates
o Q3 = June, July, August aggregated estimates
o Q4 = September, October, November aggregated estimates
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Table 5: Explanation of Different Variables and Controls used in the Modeling Process
Controls
Household
Controls
House Market
Value
Age of House as of
2008
Size of Parcel
Area

Explanation

Measured in Dollars
(in years)
Measured in squared feet

Weather Controls
Quarterly
Precipitation
Quarterly Average
Temperature (F)

Total Quarterly precipitation

Quarterly Snow

Quarterly Aggregate Snow Fall (inches)

Average Temperature for the Quarter
Palmer Drought Severity Index is a
standardized index that measures relative
Quarterly PDSI
dryness
If more than 50% of the soil in Hennepin
County experiences Moderate Drought
(Water Shortages Common and Water
Drought Level 1 Restrictions Imposed). Levels are defined by
(D1)
the US Drought Monitor
If more than 50% of the soil in Hennepin
County experiences Extreme Drought
Drought Level 2 (Widespread Water Shortages). Levels are
(D2)
defined by the US Drought Monitor
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